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(The following is to be inserted on page 2 of Brief of Appellant, 
after statement of Issues on Appeal . ) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Standard of Review for the first and second issues on 
appeal is a correction of error standard. l The Standa rd of Review 
for the third issue on appeal is a clearly erroneous standard. 2 
1 Western Kane County Special Service District v. "Jackson 
Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987); Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 138 
(Utah App. 1989). 
2 This standard, as it applies to the inadequate evidentiary 
foundation and the lower court's erroneous view of the law, is 
analyzed in depth on pages 32-41 of the Brief of Appellant . 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to utah Code Ann. §78-2-
2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the lower court erred, as a matter of law, in 
ruling that substantial completion is not the law in Utah. 
2. Whether the lower court erred, as a matter of law, in 
ruling that the liquidated damage clause was enforceable in light 
of the fact that the harm allegedly caused by the breach was 
capable and easy to accurately estimate. 
3. Whether the lower court erred in finding that there was a 
reasonable relationship between actual damages and liquidated 
damages, and whether, in fact, the actual damages bear no 
reasonable relationship to the liquidated damages under Utah law 
and result in an unenforceable penalty. 
1. None 
DETERMINATIVE CODIFIED LAW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a highway construction contract case in which the 
general contractor, L.A. Young Sons Construction (Young) and the 
State of Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) entered into a 
contract for the emergency grade raise of a section of 1-80 between 
Salt Air and Black Rock (Project). 
In 1985, The Great Salt Lake was rapidly rising due to record 
2 
rain fall. Waves were washing over 1-80 at the Project site. UDOT 
solicited bids from contractors to raise the grade of 1-80 and, 
literally, save a vital east-west artery linking Salt Lake City to 
western cities. The Project was ca.lled "Emergency Grade-Raise and 
Slope Protection." 
Young was one of four con"tractors who decided to tackle the 
Project. Young's was the lowest bid at $9,940,893.25--
$2,243,812.25 lower than UDOT's own engineers' estimate of 
$12,184,705.50. 
UDOT set the completion date at October 15, 1985 and specified 
liquidated damages of $600 per day for each day the Project ran 
past October 15, 1985. The $600 per day amount allowed no 
adjustment for substantial completion--UDOT could assess (at its 
discretion) the entire $600 charge regardless of whether the 
Project was .9 percent complet:e or 99.9 percent complete. An 
extension was granted to October 25, 1985 and the road was opened 
for full use by the traveling public by October 25, 1985. 
Some minor items remained to be completed after substantial 
completion on October 25, 1985. These incidental items did not 
affect the use of the freeway. UDOT, however, elected to continue 
to charge the full liquidated damages against Young until June 13, 
1986, when UDOT stopped charging time. 
After subtracting time extensions totaling 85 days, UDOT 
assessed liquidated damages of $94,800 against Young. This amount 
was withheld from Young's contract price and has never been paid. 
Young, a large road contractor, defaulted on several other projects 
3 
and its surety, Reliance Insurance Company (Reliance), made 
payments totaling over $2, 000, 000 on behalf of Young, thereby 
becoming subrogated to Young's claim against UDOT on this Project. 
Young also assigned its claims against UDOT for unpaid contract 
funds to Reliance. 
This suit is a breach of contract action to recover $94,800 
which UDOT has not paid and which is still owing under the 
contract. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Deposition of the Trial Court 
The case was tried to the court on March 26-29, 1991.' UDOT 
defended based on its exercise of discretion to withhold $94,800 as 
liquidated damages. Reliance, however, argued that (1) the Project 
was substantially complete on October 25, 1985 and UDOT could not 
properly withhold liquidated damages after the project was 
substantially complete, (2) the liquidated damages provision was 
unenforceable because the alleged harm was capable and easy to 
accurately estimate, and (3) UDOT could not properly withhold the 
liquidated damages because the liquidated damage amount did not 
bear any reasonable relationship to the actual damages UDOT 
incurred after the Proj ect was substantially completed, and the 
liquidated damages clause as UDOT chose to apply it under these 
facts operates as a penalty and is therefore unenforceable. 
The court ruled that UDOT could withhold nearly $100,000 in 
, The trial involved two main issues. The first issue dealt 
with an interpretation of the UDOT-drafted Specifications regarding 
cushion-course material for which Young made a clam of $573,383. 
That issue is not before this Court. Only the liquidated damages 
issue is the subject of this appeal. 
4 
liquidated damages after the Project was substantially completed. 
Reliance, believing the t:rial court's one finding of fact 
regarding liquidated damages to be in error, and, noting what it 
respectfully submits are serious errors of law regarding liquidated 
damages, elected to appeal to this Court and seek a reversal of 
these errors. 
C. Designation of the Parties 
The following defines the relationship of the parties, and the 
designation of the parties during trial and on this appeal: 
RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY (Heliance), surety (subrogated to 
Young's claims against UDOT) , PLAINTIFF and APPELLANT. 
L.A. YOUNG SONS CONSTR.uCTION (Young), general contractor 
(Principal of Reliance and General Contractor to UDOT) , NOT A PARTY 
TO THIS APPEAL. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (UDOT), owner of the 
Project, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Reliance's predecessor in interest, L.A. Young Sons 
Construction Company (Young) was the successful bidder on the U·tah 
Department of Transportation Project designated as Project No. IR-
80-3(95)102, Black Rock to Old Salt Air, Emergency Grade Raise and 
Slope Protection (Project).' 
The bids for the construction of the project opened April 23, 
1985, the Project was awarded on April 30, 1985, work actually 
, Findings of Fact, August 2, 1991 (Findings), , 1; Reporters 
Transcript (RT) , p. 174. 
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commenced on May 2, 1985, and a contract was formally signed on May 
13, 1985. A Notice to Proceed was issued May 13, 1985 by UDOT.' 
This was an emergency proj ect. 4 UDOT originally set the 
completion date at October 15, 1985--the date that marks the last 
day on which, by UDOT's policy, asphalt should be laid before the 
onset of colder temperatures. l The contract specified liquidated 
damages of $600 per day for each day the contract ran over the 
completion date. The $600 a day liquidated damages amount was the 
same for liquidated damages occurring before and after substantial 
completion. 6 
On October 14, 1985, Young requested an extension of time to 
lay asphalt, which extension was granted by UDOT.' By October 25, 
1985, Young had finished laying asphalt and the roadway was opened 
for its full and unrestricted use by the motoring public.' Not 
all work was completed by that date: some signs remained to be 
installed, topsoil, seeding and other warm weather landscape work 
needed to be done, and permanent striping had to be completed, 
although temporary striping was in place. 9 But that date--October 
J Findings, ~ 3 . 
4 Findings, ~ 1; Ex. 1 . RT, p. 175, 1. 13. , 
5 Findings, ~ 25; RT, p. 93, 11. l2-17. 
6 Findings, ~ 26; Ex. 4. 
, Exs. 37 and 38; RT, pp. 94-95. 
, Findings, ~ 28; April 4, 1991 Bench Decision, p. 8, 1. 21; 
RT p. 190, 1. 16. 
9 Findings, ~ 29. 
6 
25, 1985·--is the day on which the project was available for its 
intended use. As the trial court stated in its Bench Decision, 
"the road was opened for, essentially, full use by the travelling 
public [on October 25, 1985].,,10 
The sign work was comple1:ed by January 13, 1986. 11 Between 
that date and February 25, 1986, Young did not work on the project. 
UDOT continued to charge administrative costs to the project during 
this period for such activities as measuring pay quantities, taking 
core samples, plotting cross"sections, and calculating areas. 12 
Young finished the topsoil wor]e and other warm weather minor items 
of work on June 13, 1986, and UDOT stopped charging t.ime on the 
Project on that date." 
UDOT granted extensions of time totaling 85 days as reflected 
in supplemental Agreement No. 12, which extended the contract 
completion date to January 8, 1986. 14 
UDOT assessed liquidated damages of $600 per day for the 156 
days between January 8, 1986 and June 13, 1986. 15 UDOT withheld 
$94,800 and has never paid that amount of the contract price to 
Young or Reliance, who is Young's assignee and successor in 
10 Bench Decision, p. 8, 11. 20-21. 
11 Findings, ~ 27, 28, 29. 
12 RT pp. 200-202. 
13 Findings ~ 27, 28, 29. 
14 Findings, ~ 27; Ex. 57 .. 
15 originally, UDOT erroneously calculated the assessment at 
$94,800, but UDOT has acknowledged the correct calculation to be 
$93,600. Findings, ~ 27. 
7 
interest. 16 
UDOT assessed these liquidated damages preportedly for its 
increased overhead associated with completing the work. UDOT 
calculated its construction and engineering costs for the Project 
for the six months of January through June 1986 to be $65,029.79,17 
but a large portion of those costs were for activities that UDOT 
would have performed whether or not the project was completed by 
the specified completion date. 18 In fact, the majority of the work 
performed by the UDOT engineering crew on the Project during the 
winter months was in measuring pay quantities. 19 
For over 30 years, UDOT has kept detailed records of its 
engineering charges on each federally aided project.20 UDOT uses 
these records to bill the federal government for reimbursement of 
a percentage of these costS.'1 This Project was a federally aided 
16 Findings, ~ 27. 
17 Exs. 64 and 84. 
18 RT, pp. 200-208. John F. Nye, who was UDOT's project 
engineer on this project, testified that a substantial portion of 
the activities for which UDOT had charged as engineering costs were 
costs for activities which would have taken place regardless of a 
delay in the completion date. For example, these acti vi ties 
included measuring pay quantities, measuring quantities of 
bituminous surfaces, measuring quantities of untreated base course, 
measuring quantities of borrow, performing core sampling, plotting 
cross section of the Project, calculating areas of the Project, 
rechecking quantities. Id. 
19 RT, pp. 200-203, l. 7 . 
20 RT, p. 412, ll. 17-2l. 
21 RT, p. 408, ll. 14-25. 
8 
proj ect. 22 The charges are grouped into such categories as 
salaries, indirect costs (which include rental on office and 
laboratory trailers and utilities), equipment rentals, testing, 
engineering supplies, and laboratory supplies. 23 UDOT keeps 
ledgers that show the charges in these and other categories for 
each day, down to the penny. 2·' The information can be produced to 
show the totals for six-month period or can be extracted to show 
the tota 1 s f or one month. 25 
section 108.08 of the standard Specifications applicable to 
the contract provides: 
. for each calendar day after a specified 
completion date that: any work shall remain 
uncompleted after the contract time specified 
per the completion of i:he work provided for 
in the contract the sum specified below [$600 
for calendar day is the rate specified in 
Addendum No. 2 to the St:andard Specifications 
and which was applicable to this contract] 
will be deducted from any money due the 
contractor, not as a penal ty, but as 
liquidated damages for Department's increased 
overhead; (Emphasis added.)M 
section 108.08 of the Standard Specifications also states: 
The Department may waive such portions of the 
liquidated damages a.s may accrue after the 
work is in condition for safe and convenience 
n Ex. 53, RT, pp. 162-163. 
23 Ex. 64; RT, p. 374. 
~ Exs. 64 and 65. 
~ RT p. 373, 1. 9 through p. 374 1. 24; p. 408, 11. 11-20; p. 
412, 11. 17-21; and Exs. 64 and 65. 
M Findings, ~ 26; Ex. 4. 
9 
use by the travelling public. v 
Section 108.06, Determination of Contract Time, provides that 
liquidated damages will be calculated as follows: 
When final acceptance has been duly made by 
the Engineer as prescribed in subsection 
105.16 [acceptance J, the daily time charge 
will cease." 
This case went to a bench trial before Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
on March 26, 27, 28 and 29, 1991. The appealed issue before this 
Court is whether UDOT was justified in withholding nearly $100,000 
in liquidated damages after substantial completion of the Project. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The public had full and complete use of the Project on October 
25,1985, at which time the Project was substantially complete. 
Under the terms of the contract between UDOT and Young, UDOT was 
not required to assess liquidated damages, but still elected to 
impose upon Young the full $600-a-day liquidated damages fine after 
the Project was substantially completed. The lower court upheld 
UDOT's decision to assess the full liquidated damage amount against 
UDOT even though the total penalty amount had no reasonable 
relationship to UDOT's actual increased overhead and the clause, 
under these circumstances, operated as a penalty. 
The liquidated damages should have stopped running on the 
substantial completion date of October 25, 1985 (or at least should 
27 Findings, ~ 26; Ex. 4. 
28 Ex. 4., section 105.16, Acceptance, provides that the 
Engineer will make an inspection and accept the work if the work 
"is found completed to his satisfaction." 
10 
have been reduced substantially to reflect the much lesser costs 
incurred by UDOT after substantial completion); the liquidated 
damages assessed against Young bear no reasonable relationship to 
the actual damages incurred by UDOT; and, under the circumstances, 
the liquidated damages clause operates as a penalty. Therefore, 
the lower court's ruling regarding substantial completion and 
unenforceable penalty and its finding regarding the reasonable 
relationship of the liquidated damages to actual damages should all 
be reversed. 
ARGUMlmT 
The following argument first establishes in Point 1 that 1:he 
doctrine of sUbstantial completion is or should be the law in utah. 
Point 11 establishes that the actual damages were not incapable or 
very difficult of accurate estimation. Finally, Point III 
establishes that there is no reasonable relationship between the 
assessed liquidated damages and UDOT's actual damages and, 
therefore, the liquidated damages clause operates as a penalty and 
is unenforceable. 
Point I 
The Lower Court Erred, liS a Matter of Law, 
in Ruling that Substantial Completion 
is Not the Law in Utah 
The lower court's fifth conclusion of law states: 
The court concludes that the doctrine of 
substantial completion does not apply to the 
facts of this case nor is there case law in 
the state of Utah to t:hat: effect. 
This is error. The statement is an incorrect statement of 
utah law for two reasons. First, it is error to state that the 
11 
doctrine of substantial completion does not apply to the facts of 
this case. Second, there is case law to the effect that 
substantial completion is the law in utah. In addition, all other 
jurisdictions' reported cases which have dealt with sUbstantial 
completion "accept" the doctrine; that is, substantial completion 
is possible without a project being 100 percent complete. 
A. The Doctrine of Substantial Completion in utah 
Clearly, Utah law does accept the doctrine of sUbstantial 
performance, the doctrine from which substantial completion 
derives. This doctrine is expressed in a utah construction 
contract case, Stephens v. Doxey.H In Stephens, the contractor 
completed the work, but "not very satisfactorily." The Supreme 
Court noted that the law allows for "substantial compliance" with 
plans and specifications: 
In this class of cases the law contemplates a 
sUbstantial compliance with the plans and 
specifications; that any structure should be 
so substantially erected and completed as to 
subserve the purposes and uses for which it lS 
intended. 30 
The Court went on to explain how the doctrine of sUbstantial 
performance works with the doctrine of substantial compliance: 
We may remark, however, that in this class of 
cases the trend of decisions in recent years 
has been to hold that there must be a 
substantial, not punctil ious, performance of 
builder's contracts. So, too, it is generally 
held that on the one hand the contractor may 
not be permitted to profit by reason of his 
noncompliance with the contract, while on the 
H 198 P. 261 (Utah 1921). 
30 rd. at 198. 
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other hand the owner will not be permitted to 
reap the benefits of the added value to his 
property where, of necessity and in the verv 
nature of things, substantial benefits have 
accrued by reason of labor performed and 
materials furnished t1Y...J:he contractor for the 
bui lding. 31 
The Court relied on the doctrine, of' substantial performance and th~' 
builder's SUbstantial compliance, in addition to other reasons 
stated in the opinion, and reversed the trial court's judgment. 
The doctrine of substantial completion, by analogy. and for the 
same common sense reasons, appl ies in utah. The reasoning and 
analysis of the Stephens case are the same reasoning and analysis 
which urge application of the doctrine of substantial completion in 
this case before this Court. 
f'3. The Doctrine of Substantial Completion 
is Accepted in All Jurisdictions 
Liquidated damages may not be assessed after a project 
achieves SUbstantial completion. SUbstantial completion ; , .... ~., a 
principle of contract law which, when applied in a construct.ion 
context, provides that substantial performance of a building or 
constructcion contract will support a recovery on that contract. 32 
SUbstantial completion occurs when the owner has the use and 
benefit of the contractor's work and the project can be used for 
its intended purpose. 33 The rationale behind substantcial 
31 Id--"- (emphasis added). 
J2 13 Am. Jur. 2d Building and Construction Contracts §41;' 64 
Am. Jur. 2d Public Works and Contracts §106. 
33 13 Am. Jur. 2d BuildinE.......i~nd Construction Contracts ~;4 3, 
cited in Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Butte-Meade Sanitary 
Water District, 500 F. Supp. 193 (D. S.D. 1980); Heinkel v. city of 
13 
completion is that sUbstantial performance is equivalent to 
completion of the work. Substantial performance is completion in 
the eyes of the law. 
The factors to be considered in determining whether a project 
is substantially complete are set forth in Berglund-Johnson, 
Inc.,~ as follows: 
The reported cases considering substantial 
completion as a basis for relief from 
assessment of liquidated damages generally 
look to the percentage of the completed as 
compared to the entire contract, the volume 
and nature of the uncompleted work, and, most 
importantly, to the degree the work is 
available for its intended use in the absence 
of the uncompleted item or items." 
It is virtually black letter construction law that after a 
project has been substantially completed, the owner may not assess 
liquidated damages against the contractor. This rule is based on 
the fact that the owner has received essentially what it contracted 
for and, therefore, to assess the contractor liquidated damages 
Corvallis, 510 P.2d 579 (Ore. App. 1973). 
~ VABCA No. 965, 71-1 BCA ~ 8834 (1971). 
35 Id. at 41,073 (emphasis added). See J&A Pollin Construction 
Co., GSBCA 2780 70-2 BCA ~ 8562 (1970) (liThe basic purpose of the 
contract must be considered, and the real test to be applied to the 
question of substantial completion is the date on which the 
facilities may first be used and enjoyed by the government for the 
purpose for which they were intended."); T.J. Crooks, Jr. , 
Contractor, GBCA No. T-206, 66-2 BCA ~ 5775 (1966) ("Substantial 
completion occurs on the date the work is satisfactorily completed 
to the extent that the facilities might be occupied or used by the 
government for the purpose for which they were intended.); Ray 
Martin Co., VABC 333, 4 G.C. 129 (1962); Electronic and Missile 
Facilities Inc., ASBCA 10077, 66-1 BCA ~ 5493; and Fischer 
Construction Co., ASBCA No. 7264, 1962 BCA ~ 3497. 
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when the owner has use of the proj ect would constitute a penal t:y. 36 
since a sUbstantial performance is equivalent to completion of the 
work, there can be no assessment of liquidated damages. The 
rationale is that liquidated damages designed to approximate the 
loss to the owner before c1ccupancy would become a penalty if 
imposed after the owner is able to use the project. 
Courts have recognized t:hat parties to construction contracts 
generally do not intend for liquidated damage charges to apply 
after substantial performance of the contract occurs, even when 
part of t.he work is unsatisfact.ory and rej ected. For example, the 
Supreme Court of Nebraska has note,d that a large road construct:ion 
contract which includes a daily liquidated damage charge clause 
should not be construed as being intended to apply to instances 
where everything under the contract is performed except for a 
limi ted amount of incomplete or unsatisfactory gutt.er work.]"! 
Similarly, when a building construction contractor was 
substantially performed and thE~ building was in fact used shortly 
after the scheduled date, but final acceptance was delayed several 
months due to problems attributabl,e to defected design or materi.al, 
the liquidated damage delay charge was interrupted not to apply to 
36 continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. v. Uni.ted 
States, 101 F. Supp. 755, 758 (ct. Cl. 1952), cert. denied 343 U.S. 
963 (1952); S. L. Rowland Construction Co. v. Beall Pipe and Tank 
Corp., 14 Wash. App. 297, 540 P.2d 912, 921-922 (1975). 
3" Yant Construction Co. v. Village of Campbell, 123 Neb. 360, 
243 N.W. 77 (1932). 
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days after substantial performance. 38 
Likewise, in S.L. Rowland Construction Co. v. Beall Pipe & 
Tank corp.," the project was a pipeline project for the city of 
Everett, Washington. The court denied the city's claim for 
liquidated damages for the period after the pipeline was put into 
full use with the exception of certain punch list items, primarily 
clean-up and landscaping, which were still being performed. In 
Rowland, the city's water pipeline was fully operational on 
February 1, 1968. However, the entire proj ect was not finally 
accepted until June 18, 1968. Between February 1, 1968 and June 
18, 1968, the contractor performed landscaping, clean-up and 
relatively minor portions of work. 
The Rowland court held: 
We hold that a liquidated damage clause in a 
pipeline construction contract, which requires 
the contractor to pay the same $150 daily rate 
of damages after the pipeline was put into 
full operation as before, amounted to a 
penalty after the pipeline was put into full 
use. The clause was, therefore, invalid 
insofar as it purported to determine damages 
after the line was put into full use by the 
municipality. 
This prevailing principle is also recognized and applied 
throughout government construction contract cases. 40 The Paul A. 
38 Northern Petrochemical Co. v. Thorsen & Thorshov Inc., 211 
N.W. 2d 159 (1973). 
39 14 Wash. App. 297, 540 P.2d 912 (1975). 
40 See e.g .. Two State Construction Co., DOTBCA Nos. 78-31, 
1006, 1070, 1081, 81-1 BCA ~ 15,149 (1981); Berglund-Johnson Inc., 
VABCA No. 965, 71-1 BCA ~ 8834 (1971); NorAir Enginerring Corp., 
GSBCA Nos. 2728, 2985, 70-1 BCA ~ 8350 (1970); T.J. Crooks Jr. 
Contractor, see GSBCA No. T-206, 66-2 BCA ~ 5775 (1966) 
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Teegarden" case is representative of the doctrine of substantial 
comple·tion and is similar to circumstances of the case before this 
Court. Teegarden was the contcractor on a road project for the 
National Park Service. Because of rainy, wet weather and flooding 
of its asphalt plant, the contractor requested extensions of time 
to complete the project, but the contracting officer denied the 
request and assessed liquidated damages. An inspection of work 
dated June 22, 1962, showed that approximately 92 percent of all 
work had been completed, with the uncompleted work consisting of 
some minor topsoiling, seeding, sodding and completion of a change 
order. The Interior Board of Cont'ract Appeals concluded that the 
project: was substantially complet:e on June 22, 1962 and that 
liquidated damages should not have been assessed between that date 
and the date used as a completion date by the contracting officer. 
According to the factors set: out in the foregoing case,s, 
liquidated damages in this case are contrary to law. First, t.he 
emergency nature of the project.--tco raise the grade of 1-80 and 
protect it from being washed out by The Great Salt Lake--was 
accomplished. To use language fron the Rowland case, the roadway 
"was put into full operation." Exhibit 56 shows that UDOT 
considered the eSSence of the contract to be the protection of the 
("Substantial completion occurs on the date the work is 
satisfactorily completed to the extend that the facilities might be 
occupied or used by the governme,nt for the purpose for which they 
were intended.); Electrical Enterprises Inc., IBCA No. 972-9-72, 
74-1 BCA ~ 10,400 (1973); George E .. Jensen, Contractor, Inc., VABCA 
Nos. 606, 67-2 BCA ~ 6506 (1967); Paul A. Teegarden, IBCA No. 419-
1-64, 65-2 BCA ~ 5011 (1965). 
4' IBCA No. 419-1-64, 65-2 BCA ~5011 (1965). 
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road and its opening for public use. Mr. Nye of UDOT referred to 
the October 15 completion date, which is the last date asphalt 
normally is laid, as a date by which the critical purpose of the 
Project was to be accomplished. Once again, the entire roadway was 
available for full and unrestricted use by the motoring public no 
later than October 25, 1985. 
Second, although the foregoing cases state that percentages of 
completion are not conclusive, this Project achieved approximately 
98 percent completion by early December 1985, according to the pay 
estimates in Exhibit 63. In other words, Young was penalized 100 
percent of the liquidated damages when the work was 98 percent 
complete. 
Third, by far the largest portion of the uncompleted work was 
the topsoil placement and seeding, which were not critical and did 
not impact the public's use of the highway. Therefore, under the 
significant weight of case authority cited above, liquidated 
damages on this Project should not have been assessed after the 
date of substantial completion of the project, October 25, 1985. 
C. UDOT's "Contrary Authority" Also Recognizes 
Substantial Completion and Does Not Preclude 
its Application in this Case. 
UDOT has previously relied on a couple of cases which appear 
to run contrary to the great weight of case authority. The cases 
relied upon by UDOT, Ledbetter Bros. Inc. v. North Carol ina 
Department of Transportation," and Sutter Corp. v. Tri-Boro 
" 314 S.E.2d 761 (N.C. App. 1984). 
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Munici2£l Authority,43 do not undermine the principles established 
by the considerable case authority cited above. At first blush, 
Ledbetter appears to be similar factually to the case at hand, but 
closer scrutiny reveals critical distinctions. 
First, there is no mention in Ledbetter of the percentage or 
dollar amount that was uncompleted at the scheduled completion 
date. We do not know how much of the contract was complete. 
Second, the specification stated that delay would "result in 
damages due to public inconvenience, obstruction of traffic, [and] 
interference with business" in addition to increased engineering, 
inspection, and administrative costs. By contrast, in the case 
before this Court, by far the larg'est portion of uncompleted work 
was landscaping, which did no't impact the safety or convenience of 
the public. The UDOT specification and the North Carolina 
specification are different. UD01"s specification does not state 
that the purpose of the liquidated damages is to compensate for 
damage due to public inconvenience, obstruction to traffic, or 
interference with business, all of which were considerations under 
the Ledbetter specification. In any event, none of those public 
interests were implicated by the lack of landscaping on 1-80. 
Third, Ledbetter gave only lip service to the issue of 
sUbsta:C\tial completion. The court rej ected the concept of 
sUbstantial completion without discussing or citing any cases. 
There was no analysis. It is possible that, using the criteria 
enumerated above, the court in Ledbetter would have properly 
~ 487 A.2d 933 (Pa. Super. 1985). 
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concluded that the highway in that case was not available for its 
intended use in the absence of properly functioning guard-rails and 
signs. But, to the extent the case simply rejects out-of-hand the 
doctrine of sUbstantial completion, it is clearly in the minority 
and goes against the sUbstantial weight of case authority dealing 
with substantial completion. 
The Sutter court did not adequately address the issue of 
substantial completion. It is not possible to determine from the 
discussion of the "extensive deficiencies" in the sewer treatment 
facility whether those deficiencies restricted the intended use of 
the facility . We simply cannot know whether the project was in 
"full operation" or "available for its intended purpose." In this 
case, the incomplete landscaping did not restrict the full use of 
1-80 and 1-80 was in "full operation." 
Fourth, even where the relevant specifications refer to 
"completion" and failure to "complete the work by the completion 
date" (as in Ledbetter, Sutter and this case) the doctrine of 
substantial completion applies. In Appeal of Powers Contracting 
Co.,~ the contract provision regarding liquidated damages required 
the contractor to pay liquidated damages for each calendar day of 
delay until the work was "completed or accepted." The appeal board 
stated: "It does not say that liquidated damages are payable for 
the time after completion. A substantial performance is completion 
~ ASBCA 1430 (1985), guoted in 5 McBride & Wachtel, Government 
Contracts § 37.130. 
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in the eyes of the law. ,,45 
Likewise, in Appeal of Roqer'~, 46 the appeal board stated: 
If the phrase "completed or accepted" be given 
the construction adoptE,d by the contracting 
officer, appellant will be forced to pay 
liquidated damages for a delay of 122 days in 
one contract and a delay of 88 days in the 
other, during which th,~ government had full 
utilization of all the facilities he 
contracted to construct, all because he had to 
perform the most trivial sort of work, both in 
character and amount, after the completion 
dates of the contract. That result would be 
so unreasonable, irrational, and inequitable, 
that the provision for liquidated damages 
would be a penalty, in effect, and therefore 
invalid and unenforceable. The parties could 
not have intended such an absurd and 
oppressive result at. the time they made the 
contract. 
To the extent UDOT argues that the doctrine of sUbstantial 
completion is not applicable to its specifications, it likewise 
argues for an oppressive result that renders its liquidated damages 
provision a penalty. 
D. In Refusing to hill,ly the Doctrine of 
SUbstantial Comple,tion. the Lower Court 
Sanctions thp Enforcement of 
an Improper Penalty. 
The underlying basis for applying the doctrine of substantial 
comple,tion under these circumst:ances is that the contractor should 
not be forced to pay full liquidated damage charges when the 
Project is substantially completed--fully completed as far as the 
public was concerned. Why should a contractor who has 
substantially performed 99.9 percent of a contract be forced to pay 
45 Id. at 34-83 (emphasis added). 
u WDBCA 197, lCCF 841 (1943). 
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100 percent of the same liquidated damages as the contractor who 
only performed .9 percent? 
UDOT was not forced to assess this $100,000 penalty on a 
project that was substantially complete. On the contrary, UDOT's 
own specifications state: 
The Department may waive such portions of the 
liquidated damages as may accrue after the 
work is in condition for safe and convenient 
use by the traveling public. 4? 
Further, UDOT actually advanced the doctrine of substantial 
completion to the Federal Highway Administration in an attempt to 
gain a time extension for Young which would have meant a release of 
the $100,000 penalty held by UDOT. Mr. Bert L. Taylor, who was 
UDOT's Engineer for Construction, wrote the following petition in 
favor of the doctrine of substantial completion to the FHWA: 
UDOT's position on the above problem is we 
feel there should be some flexibility in the 
charging of liquidated damages. There are 
times when neither the public nor UDOT is 
inconvenienced by the extension of time and 
the position of Mr. Howell [substantial 
completion] seems to be the correct one. 
There are other times when either the public 
or UDOT is experiencing inconveniences and 
full liquidated damages should apply to force 
the contractor into completion.~ 
The lower court's limited response to UDOT's former (and our 
present) request for application of the doctrine of substantial 
completion is this: "This Court declines to make a better contract 
47 Ex. 4, § 108.08. 
4' Ex. 59; RT, pp. 164-166. Implicit in Mr. Taylor's 
statement, "There are other times.. "is that this situation is 
not one of those other times that merits liquidated damages. 
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for the party than they have made for themselves. ,,49 This response 
is from a case, Ted R. Brown & Associates Inc. v. Carnes Corp.,~ 
which the lower court cited and reI ied upon in its BE'.nch 
Decision." The Carnes case, upon which the lower court relied, 
does not even deal with the issue of liquidated damages. The case 
stands. for the proposition that where a contract is clear and 
unambiguous, the court will not reform it. However, the case does 
not address the issue of an improper penalty, an unconscionable 
clause or an illegal clause, all of Which, even though "clear and 
unambiguous," will certainly not be enforced under Utah law. In 
fact, the many Utah cases cited in this brief which refuse to 
enforce a liquidated damage provision have done so even though the 
liquidated damage provisions were <extremely clear and unambiguous. 
The issue is whether liquidated damages as applied are a 
penalty and therefore unenforceable. The question remains, "when 
was the Project completed for purposes of turning off the 
liquidated damage faucet? Even if we indulge in the lower court's 
rigid approach for a moment, ignore the many Utah cases which 
refuse to enforce liquidated damages provisions and focus only on 
the "clear and unambiguous" meaning of the contract, we find that 
the contract is really not so "clear and unambiguous." The lower 
court has fixed its sights on one isolated phrase in the contract 
to the exclusion of a fair reading of the entire contract: 
o Conclusions of law, ~ 7. 
~ 753 P.2d 964 (Utah App. 1988). 
5} . • Bench Declslon, p. 9, 1. 17. 
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When the contract completion time is a fixed 
calendar date, it shall be the date on which 
all work on the Project shall be completed.'2 
Once again, this contract phrase only begs the question: What 
is completion? Reversing itself from its former advocacy of the 
doctrine of sUbstantial completion, UDOT now would have this Court 
believe, for purposes of liquidated damages, "complete" means 100 
percent complete--totally performed in every single, minute, last 
item. However, upon further reading of the contract's 
specification, we discovered that this language actually refers to 
the completion date in general. 
The completion date for purposes of shutting off the flow of 
liquidated damages is not the same--or at least it does not appear 
to be the same. For purposes of liquidated damages, "the daily 
time charge will cease . . [w]hen final acceptance has been duly 
made by the engineer as prescribed in subsection 105.16."" 
In other words, the contract's completion for purposes of 
liquidated damages is subjectively made by the engineer when the 
engineer issues its final acceptance. Couple this subj ecti ve 
determination by the engineer with the express statement in section 
108.08 that "the Department may waive such portions of the 
liquidated damages as may accrue after the work is in condition for 
safe and convenient use by the travelling public," and UDOT's rigid 
application of liquidated damages obviously becomes a penalty and 
unenforceable under applicable utah law which deals with the issue 
52 Ex. 4, § 108.06. 
'3 Ex. 4, § 160.06. 
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of liquidated damages. 
Point II 
Because the Harm Allegeclly Caused by the Breach was 
Capable and very Easy t,o Estimate, the Trial Court 
Erred, as a Matter of La'l«, in Ruling that the 
Liquidated Damage Cla'use was Enforceable 
utah law pertaining to liquidated damages follows the 
Restatement of contracts § 339: 
(1) An agreement, made in advance of 
breach, fixing the dama.ges therefor, is not 
enforceable as a contract and does not affect 
the damages recoverable :for the breach, unless 
(a) the amount so fixed is a reasonable 
forecast of just compensation for the 
harm that is caused by the breach, and 
(b) The harm tha"t is caused by the breach 
is one that is incapable or very 
difficult of accurate estimation. 
The Festatement as quoted a.bove is the law relied upon by Utah 
cases which interpret liquidated damages provisions.~ A 
~ Robbins v. Finlay, 645 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1982); Johnson v. 
Carman, 572 F.2d 371, 373 (Utah 1977); Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 
468, 476-77, 243 P.2d 446, 450-51 (1952). Utah Supreme Court cases 
have also relied on other similar authorities: 
• 
In spite of the language of cases regarding 
the intention of the parties, there is little 
doubt that a sum named as liquidated damages 
in order to be given effect must be reasonable 
in amount. Under the recent decisions of the 
most authoritative courts, the primary 
question seems to be whether the parties 
honestly endeavored to fix a sum equivalent in 
value to the breach. This is but saying in 
other words that the, n'!asonableness or the 
unreasonableness of the stipulation is 
decisive. 
S. Williston, The Law of contracts, §779 (rev. ed. 1950), cited in 
Perkin~, 243 P.2d at 451. 
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discussion relating to the first test of this provision, the 
"reasonable relation test," is found in Point III, beginning on 
page 29 of this Br ief . The second test, the " incapable or 
difficult of accurate estimation test," is discussed in this Point. 
In Perkins v. Spencer, 55 the Supreme Court cited both the 
Restatement and Williston and held that a liquidated damage 
provision must meet both criteria; that is, (1) the agreement must 
be a reasonable forecast of just compensation for the harm caused 
by the breach and (2) the damage actually suffered must be 
incapable of accurate determination.~ 
In Perkins, a seller of real estate property attempted to 
retain as liquidated damages one-fourth of the sales price which 
the buyer had made as a down payment. The buyer had also paid 
monthly rent. The Supreme Court held that the seller's loss was 
limi ted to (1) loss of an advantageous bargain, (2) any property 
damage to or depreciation of the property, (3) any decline in value 
due to change in market value of the property, and (4) the fair 
market value of the property during the period of occupancy. The 
court held that the damages resulting from these losses "could be 
determined with a high degree of certainty."D The Supreme Court 
therefore held that the liquidated damage provision failed to meet 
the "incapable of accurate determination" requirement and refused 
to enforce the offending liquidated damage provision. 
55 243 P. 2 d 446 (1952). 
56 Id. at 451. 
57 Id. 
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Likewise, in Rowland, the court stated, and the city's 
engineer testified, that the engineering firm billed the city some 
$6,000 between the substantial completion date and the date of 
final acceptance. The contract, however, levied a straight $150-a-
day "charge" for all work not completed--even for work which 
remained after the pipeline was put into full operation. The court 
then s:tat:ed the law regarding how liquidated damage provisions rmst 
be draftE~d: 
In drafting liquidated damages clauses, care 
should be taken to seE' that, if the clause 
applies to breaches of varying seriousness, 
the amount to be paid is: adjustable to fit the 
probable damage. 5 
The Court then held tha1:, in addition to the charge not 
constitut:ing a reasonable forecast: of compensation, there was also 
no "real difficulty in ascert:aining the damages that 'would be 
caused by such breaches once that point in work was reached. ,,'9 
The Court further stated: 
The liquidated damages clause was, therefore, 
unenforceable after February 1, 1968 [the date 
of substantial completion] since after that 
date it had an in terrorem effect of inducing 
a performance rather then the permitted effect 
of compensating for loss.w 
In this case, the undisputed facts presented at trial 
established that the harm of which UDOT complains--its "increased 
overhead"--was highly capable and easy to accurately estimate at 
5>: Rowland, 540 P.2d at 922" citing C. McCormick, Damages § 156 
(1935) . 
~ 540 P.2d at 922. 
6{) Id....!..,. 
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the time the contract was executed, thereby failing the second 
test. UDOT actually records in great detail its engineering 
charges and, based upon those charges, produces an estimate that 
appears in UDOT' s standard Specif ications. 61 The very nature of 
the information from which it is derived belies the notion that 
UDOT's "increased overhead" (the criterion of compensation used in 
its liquidated damage specifications) is difficult to ascertain." 
UDOT's only possible reply to this rather clear statement of 
law is that UDOT is damaged by other contractors seeing Young's 
example and also delaying. UDOT may attempt to characterize this 
"damage" as "incapable of accurate determination." However, this 
reply is unpersuasive for three reasons. 
First, UDOT has not shown any correlation between one 
contractor's delay and an increased propensity of other contractors 
to also delay. This is sheer speculation which UDOT manufactured 
to plug a gaping hole in its basis for assessing liquidated 
damages. 
Second, and more important, if making an example of Young is 
UDOT's reason for assessing liquidated damages, this reason is 
improper because it is nothing less than a penalty. In essence, 
UDOT is punishing Young--decapi tating Young, as it were, and 
placing its head on a pole for all to see. The liquidated damage 
penalty has no correlation whatsoever to the actual damages which 
61 Exhibits 4, 64 and 65. 
" Reliance must acknowledge that there are some limitations to 
UDOT's calculations. Margaret Dammaschke testified she could not 
tell what activities were being performed. RT pp. 411-412. 
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UDOT may have incurred because of the delay. This penal motive 
cannot support enforcement of 2L liquidated damage provision. 63 
Finally, UDOT's own specifications state that the basis for 
liquidated damage is "not as a penalty, but for the department's: 
increased overhead." The dama':Je that the specifications seek to 
remedy is not some speculative detriment to UDOT's relationship to 
the Federal Highway Administration or to other contractors, but its 
increased overhead. And, as it has been shown, UDOT's overhead can 
be calculated with great accuracy. Therefore, the provision is 
unenforceable under these circumstances. 
Point III 
Because the Actual Damages Ilear No Reasonable Relationship 
to the Liquidated Damages and Result in a Penalty 
Under Utah Law, the LO'W'er Court Erred in Finding 
that There was a Reasonable Relationship 
and that the I.iquidated Damages 
Provision was Enforceable 
To be enforceable, liquidated damages must bear some 
reasonable relationship to the amount of actual or compensatory 
damages. section 108.08 of UDOT's specifications states, " 
the sum specified below will be deducted from any money due the 
Contractor, not as a penalty, but as liquidated damages for 
Department's increased overhead; " (Emphasis added.) The 
liquidated damages in this case therefore must approximate UDOT's 
"increased overhead." The trial court erred in entering its single 
finding of fact and its conclusion of law regarding liquidated 
~ "Punishment of a promisor for breach without regard to the 
extent of the harm which he has caused, is an unjust and 
unnecessary remedy. "Restatement of Contracts, §339(1). 
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damages that there is a reasonable correlation between the damages 
UDOT actually incurred and the liquidated damages assessed by UDOT. 
Liquidated damages of approximately $94,000 far exceed the 
"increased overhead" incurred by UDOT as a result of the continuing 
construction activities of the contractor; and, when the liquidated 
damages are considered in light of the actual quantity of work 
performed by the contractor, the liquidated 
unreasonably excessive. 
A. The Amount of Liquidated Damages Must 
Bear Some Reasonable Relationship to the 
Amount of Actual or Compensatory Damages 
damages are 
In a long line of cases, this Court has established that, to 
be enforceable, liquidated damages must bear some reasonable 
relationship to the amount of actual or compensatory damages. M 
Various formulations of this rule or test appear in the cases. 
In Perkins v. spencer, the Court stated: 
This Court is committed to the doctrine, that 
where the parties to a contract stipulate the 
amount of liquidated damages that shall be 
paid in case of a breach, such stipulation is, 
as a general rule, enforceable, if the amount 
stipulated is not disproportionate to the 
damages actually sustained. Bramwell Inv. Co. 
v. Uggla, 81 Utah 85, 16 P.2d 913, 916. 
It will be observed that in all cases where 
the stipulation for liquidated damages was 
M Young Electric Sign Co. v. united Standard West, Inc., 755 
P.2d 162, 164 (Utah 1988); Allen v. Kingdon, 723 P.2d 394, 397 
(Utah 1986) i Warner v. Rasmussen, 704 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah 1985) i 
Madsen v. Anderson, 667 P.2d 44, 47 (Utah 1983) i Soffe v. Ridd, 659 
P.2d 1082, 1084 (Utah 1983) i Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 625-
626 (Utah 1982) i Johnson v. Carman, 572 P.2d 371, 373-374 (Utah 
1977) i Young Electric sign Co. v. Vetas, 564 P.2d 758 (Utah 1977) i 
Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59, 278 P.2d 294 (1954) i Perkins v. 
Spencer, 121 utah 468, 475, 243 P.2d 446, 450 (1952). 
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enforced it bore some reasonable relation to 
the actual damages which could reasonably be 
anticipated at the time the contract was made 
and was not a forfei t:ure, which would allow an 
unconscionable and exorbitant recovery.M 
In Jacobson v. Swan, the Court used the following formulation of 
the rule: 
The parties have a right: to so contract [that 
all payments which have been made under a 
uniform real estate contract will be forfeited 
as liquidated damages] and such rights should 
not be lightly interfered with. It is only 
when the forfeiture, .70uld be so grossly 
excessive as to be entirely disproportionate 
to any possible loss 1:hat might have been 
contemplated so that -to enforce it would shock 
the conscience, that a court of equity will 
refuse to enforce the provision. M 
In You~Electric Sign Co. v. Unit:ed Standard West, the Court 
said: 
... as a general rule, parties to a contract 
may agree to liquidated damages in the case of 
a breach, and such agTeements are enforceable 
if the amount of liquidated damages agreed to 
is not disproportionate to the possible 
compensatory damages and does not constitute a 
forfeiture or a penalty.~ 
This Court will also look to the Restatement of Contracts 
Section 339 for refinement oj' the rule. The Restatement is 
discussed in Point II on pages 25 to 26 of this brief. The trial 
court apparently had the reasonableness rule in mind when it 
entered its findings and conclusions. 
65 243 P.2d at 449 (some citations omitted) . 
M 278 P.2d at 298. See also Warner v. Rasmussen, supra. 
67 755 P.2d at 164, citing Madsen v. Anderson. 
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B. The Trial Court's Finding That There is a Reasonable 
Relationship Between Actual and Liguidated 
Damages, is Against the Great Weight 
of the Evidence and was Induced by an 
Erroneous View of The Law 
1. The Trial Court Entered a Single Finding Regarding the 
Reasonableness of Liguidated Damages. 
The trial court entered a single finding, Finding No. 30, 
regarding the relationship between the liquidated damages and 
UDOT's alleged actual damages. The trial court simply found that 
there is ample evidence in the record of "continuing overhead" 
which was incurred by UDOT after the project should have been 
completed, and that there is a reasonable correlation between the 
damages actually incurred and the liquidated damages assessed by 
UDOT pursuant to the contract.'8 The trial court also entered its 
Conclusion of Law No. 10 to the same effect. This single, 
conclusory finding and its related conclusion demonstrate that this 
issue did not receive the care and attention that other issues in 
the case received. Only in the Bench Decision did the trial court 
elaborate on this aspect of its ruling regarding liquidated 
damages. 69 
Reliance challenges both Finding No. 30 and Conclusion No. 10. 
Reliance acknowledges that a trial court's finding of fact will not 
be set aside unless clearly erroneous,70 but a conclusion of law is 
not entitled to the same deference; a correction of error standard 
y Findings, ~ 30. 
69 Bench Decision, pp. 8-13. 
70 Utah R. civ. P. 52(a). 
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applies to conclusions of law.71 A finding is clearly erroneous if 
it is against the great weight of evidence or if the court is 
otherwise definitely and firmly convinced that a mistake has been 
made. 72 "Findings of fact are clearing erroneous if the appellant 
can show that they are without adequate evidentiary foundation or 
if they are induced by an erroneous view of the law. ,,73 A finding 
is deemed clearly erroneous if' this Court concludes that it is 
against the clear weight of the evidence. N 
The standard of review of findings of fact is governed by Rule 
52(a) of the Utah Rules of civil Procedure. The rationale of the 
Rule is revealed by its language: 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall 
be given to the oppor1tunity of the trial court 
to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
2. The Evidence Fails to Support Finding No. 30 
To successfully challenge the trial court's finding, Reliance 
must marshal all the evidence supporting the finding and then 
demonstrate that that evidence is legally insufficient to support 
71 Western Kane County Special Servo Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson 
Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1378 (Utah 1987). It can be argued that 
the issue of reasonableness is one of law under the cases cited in 
part A of this Point III. 
72 Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989) (citing 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). 
n Western Capital and Security, Inc. v. Knudsvig, 768 P.2d 
989, 991 (Utah App. 1989), cer1~ denied, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989) 
(citing State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). 
N Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899-
900 (Utah 1989). 
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it even when it is viewed in the light most favorable to the trial 
court. 7S In this section, therefore, Reliance will review all of 
the evidence of which it is aware that supports Finding No. 30 and 
will in this and subsequent sections demonstrate that that evidence 
is insufficient. 
The trial court's Bench Decision reveals the court's thinking 
behind Finding No. 30 and Conclusion No. 10. In discussing the 
reasonableness of the liquidated damages provision as compared with 
actual damages incurred by UDOT, the court referred to two items: 
(1) liquidated damages are difficult to calculate or are not 
susceptible of easy calculation, 76 and (2) the court felt that 
there was a "reasonable correlation" between some $65,000 in 
damages actually incurred and those provided in the liquidated 
damages clause. n 
In discussing the first factor, that of the difficulty of 
determining damages, the court referred specifically to potential 
damage to the relationship between UDOT and the Federal Highway 
Administration and between UDOT and other bidders. There is 
evidence to support the court's finding of a relationship between 
UDOT and the Federal Highway Administration. There is also 
evidence to support the finding that the Federal Highway 
Administration was concerned that failing to enforce the liquidated 
damages provision would be unfair to other contractors who had bid 
75 Id. at 899. 
76 Bench Decision, pp. 11-12. 
n Bench Decision, pp. 12-13. 
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on the Project. 78 Reliance does not dispute the sUfficiency of the 
evidence to support that Finding" But that is not the type of 
damages UDOT's liquidated damages specification purports to cover. 
The specification purports to cover only "increased overhecld." 
Therefore, whether potential damage to the relationship between 
UDOT and the Federal Highway Administration or between UDOT and 
other contractors is difficult to determine is not the issue. The 
issue is whether UDOT's II'increased overhead" is readily 
ascert:ainable. The evidence on that issue is clear. The testimony 
of Margaret Dammaschke and Exhibits 64 and 65 demonstrates the 
detail with which UDOT keeps an accounting of the engineering costs 
on federally-funded highway projects, and the readiness with which 
that detail may be retrieved. ')9 It was also discretionary with 
UDOT's survey crew chief as to how to mark his time sheets to 
allocate his time between different projects. w 
The evidence supporting the 'trial court's finding that there 
was approximately $65,000 of "con'tinuing overhead costs" and that 
there is some reasonable correli~tion between those damages actually 
incurred and the liquidated damagres consists of the test,imony of 
John Nye and Margaret Dammasch!k:e and Exhibits 64, 65, 82, 83, 84, 
and 89. 
Taking chronologically the testimony of these two witnesses 
most supportive of Finding No. 30, there is first the cross-
78 RT, pp. 164-169. 
~ RT, pp. 407-411. 
W RT, p. 207, 11. 10-12. 
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examination of Mr. Nye. Mr. Nye was called as a witness by 
Reliance even though he was the Project Engineer for UDOT and is 
employed by UDOT. He testified that as of January 13, the Project 
was 89 percent complete. 81 At 89 percent complete, there would be 
approximately $1,100,000 left to complete. 82 He testified further 
that as of June 13, 1986, the Project was 95 percent complete.~ 
UDOT's counsel then attempted to elicit testimony from Mr. Nye 
regarding Exhibit 64. The court sustained several objections to 
his testimony on foundation. '" Mr. Nye did conf irm that the 
charges on Exhibit 64 were the sort of charges that would have been 
ongoing during December for his crew on the Black Rock Project. 8l 
On redirect examination by Reliance's counsel, Mr. Nye 
admitted that $1,100,000 of uncompleted work was overstated" and 
81 RT, pp. 243-244; Ex. 34, Sheet 38. 
82 RT, p. 244. 
83 RT, p. 246; Ex. 34, Sheet 59. 
'" RT, pp. 252-256. 
8l RT, p. 252, 11. 16-19. UDOT attempted to include December 
engineering charges shown on Exhibit 64 in the total engineering 
charges, in an effort to show that there is a reasonable 
relationship between the liquidated damages of $93,600 and the 
total engineering charges. RT, pp. 248-251 and Ex. 84; RT, pp. 
265-267; 371-375, 376-387 (see particularly pp. 381-382). It 
appears from the Bench Decision that the court did not include 
engineering costs in December. The Bench Decision on p. 12 at 1. 
16 refers to "some 65,000 or 70,000" dollars of overhead costs. 
The court appears to have accepted the beginning date for the 
assessment of liquidated damages as January 8 and the ending date 
as June 13. That is consistent with the Statement of Stipulated 
Facts, items 13 and 17. A copy of the Statement of Stipulated 
Facts is attached hereto in the Addendum under Tab A. 
86 RT, p. 268, 11. 22-24. 
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estimated that the accurate actual value of work remaining to be 
completed was closer to $350,000, which would have resulted in a 
percentage of completion as of January 13 of more than 89 
percent." 
Mr. Nye testified on direct examination as a witness for UDOT 
that 1:he late completion of the Black Rock Project precipitated 
overtime and required him to split. his crew between the Black Hock 
Project and the Kasler or Lakepoint Project to perform inspection 
and surveying." Mr. Nye further testified from his own records 
regarding payroll of his engineering crew, indicat.ing that he and 
his crew divided their charges be·tween the Black Rock Project and 
the KaslE~r Project in December 1985. 89 Mr. Nye test.ified that: he 
and members of his engineering crew inspected the project, checked 
the proj ect every day, documen1:ed pay items, and administered the 
contract.~ These activities took away from duties that he could 
have been performing on othE,r projects. 91 Mr. Nye testified 
further that Gail Leary, Debbie (an office person), and Dale 
Tischner checked quantities during the week ending February 7,.' 
and checked payrolls, which is something that UDOT would not have 
8'1 RT, pp. 268-276. 
8B RT, p. 372. 
8'1 R,]~ , pp. 376-379; Ex. 89. 
9<) RT, pp. 382-383. 
9, RT, p. 383, II. 23-25. 
92 RT, p.384. 
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to do if the contractor had completed its work. 93 UDOT's crew 
routinely totals tonnage tickets on a daily basis and double checks 
them with the contractor to make sure their total jives on a daily 
basis.~ UDOT would have to have an inspector and a payroll person 
charging salaries to the Black Rock project if there was any work 
going on. 95 
On cross-examination by Reliance's counsel, Mr. Nye admitted 
that the totals of the tonnage tickets have to be done regardless 
of when the Project is complete.% He also confirmed from 
information on Exhibit 34 that between January 14 and March 31, 
Young worked only nine days. 
Margaret Dammaschke, an accountant for UDOT, testified that 
Exhibits 64 and 65 list all charges for engineering construction 
for the Black Rock Project for the period of January through June 
of 1986, and for the month of December 1985.~ She also testified 
that on federally-funded projects, UDOT employees charge to a 
particular project which is identified by a charge I.D. Number. 
Those charges are then billed to the federal government on a 
participating percentage. 98 On cross-examination Ms. Dammaschke 
93 RT, p. 
~ RT, pp. 
95 RT, pp. 
% RT, p. 
~ RT, p. 
98 RT, p. 
appears to be 
Decision at p. 
384-385. 
385-386 
389-390. 
396, 11. 1-9. 
408-410; See also Ex. 84. 
408, 1. 24 through p. 409, 1.5. This testimony 
the basis for the court's statement in its Bench 
12, 11. 14-22. 
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acknOYlledged that Exhibit 64 showed the total figure for the 
engineering costs coded to the Black Rock Project for the period 
involved, and that it is not possible to tell from those totals how 
they correspond to the various engineering activities that "Iere 
being performed by the engineering crews. She also acknowledged 
that one cannot distinguish from the general ledger whether the 
engineering crews are performing inspection or calculat:ing 
materials. 99 
It is clear from the marshalling of the evidence in suppori: of 
the court's Finding No. 30 that 1:he court found that all of the 
$65,000 shown on Exhibit 64 constituted the actual damages or 
"continuing overhead" incurred by UDOT, and that $65,000 bears a 
reasonable relationship to the :?93, 600 of liquidated damages. That 
finding is clearly erroneous because it is induced by an erroneous 
view of the law I ()() and is against the clear weight of the 
evidence 4 101 
3. Finding No. 30 is induced l~m erroneous view of the law. 
The law governing this issue is the contract between UDOT and 
Young, which provides for liquidated damages for the "increased 
overhead" incurred by UDOT. Finding 30 refers to "continuinq 
overhead." There is a difference between increased overhead and 
~ RT, pp. 411-412. 
100 Western Capital and Securities, Inc. v. Knudsvig, 768 P.2d 
989 (Utah App. 1989), cert denied 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989). 
1(1 Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 
1989) . 
39 
continuing overhead. The testimony elicited by Reliance from 
UDOT's own employees and witnesses is that Exhibit 64 shows total 
overhead expenses, not just those incurred as a result of the late 
completion. 
Mr. Nye, UDOT's project engineer, testified that several of 
the activities of his crew during the period of January to June 
1986 were activities that the crew would have performed whether or 
not the project had been finished on time. lm He also testified 
that the majority of the crew's work during the winter months was 
for just such activities that would have been done--and the costs 
incurred--no matter when the proj ect was finished. IOJ Of the 
$65,029.79 in engineering costs, the largest amounts were incurred 
dur ing the winter months. l()l 
Moreover, the engineering costs for January 1 through 8 should 
be deducted from the $65,029.79, because actual damages should be 
computed only for the liquidated damages period of January 9 
through June 13. This deduction further widens the gap between the 
liquidated damages and actual damages. 
Young worked only nine days during the period from January 14 
to March 31. lru Therefore, according to the testimony of Mr. Nye, 
the type of costs that UDOT incurred when Young was working--
1m RT, pp. 200-203. See also note 18 on page 8 of this brief. 
IW RT, p. 202, 1. 25 through p. 203, 1. 7. 
104 Ex. 64. 
105 RT, pp. 396-397; Ex. 34. see also RT, pp. 262-263. 
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inspection, verifying payroll, checking quantities (tonnage 
tickets) on a daily basis, and administering the contract--should 
not have accrued. Yet, by far the largest amount of engineering 
costs shown on Exhibit 64 is the amount incurred during January, 
February, and March 1986: a total of $47,206.16 of the $65,029.79. 
It is clear from these facts t:hat a large portion, perhaps the 
majority, of UDOT's engineering costs of $65,029.79 were costs that 
UDOT would have incurred whether or not the Project ran over in 
time. The $65,029.79 was not, by a large margin, "increased 
overhead." 
4. Finding No. 30 is Against the Clear Weight of All the Evid,"nce. 
Regarding Engineering Costs 
Finding No. 30 completely oVE,rlooks the weighty testimony of 
Mr. Nye elicited by Reliance, referred to above. The finding also 
overlooks the critical testimony of Ms. Dammaschke that Exhibits 64 
and 65 represent total engineering costs and do not reflect the 
types of activities performed by t:he engineering crew. The clear 
weight of all the evidence is that UDO'I"s "increased overhead" was 
much smaller than $65,000. 
This weight of evidence cannot be disregarded on the basis 
that 1:he court assessed the credibility of the witnesses and 
decided to disregard the testimony of Reliance witnesses. The 
evidence disregarded by the court consists of testimony of UDOT's 
own witnesses. This Court therefore is not required to give the 
same deference to the trial court's finding as it would had this 
case involved conflicting testimony from witnesses for opposing 
parties, and the court had resolved the conflicts by an assessment. 
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of the witnesses' credibility. I'" 
C. The liquidated Damages Do Not Bear A Reasonable 
Relationship to UDOT's Actual Damaqes 
1. UDOT's Liquidated Damages are a Penalty 
The majority of Utah cases dealing with liquidated damages are 
real estate contract cases. 1()7 Reliance has not found any Utah 
cases treating liquidated damages provisions in construction 
contracts, particularly any case involving the assessment of 
liquidated damages under a construction contract that has achieved 
substantial completion. 
Of the liquidated damages cases decided by this Court, perhaps 
the most analogous to this case is Western Macaroni Mfg. Co. v. 
Fiore .. I~ The pertinent facts are that the macaroni company and 
Fiore entered into a contract whereby the company agreed to sell 
such amounts of macaroni as Fiore required in his business as a 
retail dealer, and 
. not to sell to any private consumer or 
to any boarding house keeper in or out of the 
state of Utah, and . not to sell to any 
other proprietor of an Italian store in Salt 
Lake city, Utah, directly or indirectly, any 
of its products without the consent of 
[Fiore], and in default or violation thereof 
[company] undertakes and agrees to pay to 
[Fiore] the sum of five hundred dollars 
($500.00) as damages, in the premises, 
The macaroni company sold macaroni to Fiore, but Fiore failed 
I'" In re: Adoption of Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah 
App. 1988). 
1()7 Robbins v. Finlay. supra, at 626, n. 5. 
I~ 47 Utah 108, 151 P. 984 (Utah 1915). 
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to pay. Upon the company's suit for payment, Fiore asserted that 
the company had sold macaroni to private consumers and other 
Italian grocery stores, and therefore that he was entitled to 
liquidated damages. The trial court found that the macaroni 
company had in fact sold macaroni as alleged, but that it was 
broken macaroni, not recognized on the market as merchantable 
macaroni, and that the company ha.d not sold the macaroni to any 
Italian store to which Fiore bad been selling. The trial court 
further found that the $500.00 damages provided for in the 
agreement was a penalty and not: liquidated damages. 
This Court affirmed, stating, 
The general rule is that, where an agreement 
imposes several distinct duties or obligations 
of different degrees of importance, and the 
same sum is named as damages for the breach of 
either indifferently, the sum is to be 
regarded as a penalty. 109 
In Perkins v. Spencer this Court discussed Fiore: 
The forfeiture appeared to apply to any breach 
of the contract which might be of varying 
degrees of importance. He was held that the 
$500. 00 forfeiture provision was a penalty 
provision which could not be enforced."o 
The case now before the court has significant similarities to 
Fiore. Like the contract in Fi9re, UDOT's contract with Young 
imposes liquidated damages of a fixed amount whether or not the 
work has achieved sUbstantial completion and whether or not the 
uncompleted work is trivial in scope or dollar value. UDOT's 
109 151 P. at 985-986 (citation omitted). 
110 243 P.2d at 450. 
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specification purports to assess this $600 a day penalty "for each 
calendar day after a specified completion date that any work shall 
remain uncompleted"lll and to continue the assessment until "all 
work on the project shall be completed, ,,112 even if such work is of 
little importance to the public's safe and convenient use of the 
roadway. 
The largest item of work that remained to be completed after 
January 13, 1986, and the item that was the major factor in UDOT's 
assessment of liquidated damages, was the topsoil work. The 
topsoil work was an extremely small percentage of the total work on 
the Project. The dollar amount of the topsoil work was 
$149,145 113--about one and one-half percent of the total contract 
value--and it was not critical to the public's safe or convenient 
use of the roadway. Like the macaroni company's peccadillo in 
Fiore, this lapse by Young was minimal and did not justify a 
penalty of $600 per day. 
The liquidated damages provision is a penalty also because it 
does not distinguish between work before substantial completion and 
work after substantial completion--the same $600 per day is 
assessed. That fact alone is sufficient grounds for showing 
unreasonableness in most jurisdictions that have considered the 
issue, particularly the united states Government agencies that 
III Ex. 4 , § 108.08 (emphasis added). 
112 Ex. 4, § 108.06; see also RT, p. 169, 11. 12-18. 
113 RT, pp. 268-269; Ex. 35. The transcript appears to be in 
error in referring to Exhibit 3 on p. 269, 1. 3. 
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specialize in construction contrac·t issues. (See the discussion of 
sUbstantial completion in Point I of this Brief.) 
A case from Washington witch facts quite similar to this case 
is illustrative. In S.L. Rowland Construction Company v. Beall 
Pipe and Tank Corporationll4 the court closely examined an action by 
a surety and its contractor against the City of Everett., 
Washington, growing out of a contract for construction of a 
pipeline. The city counter-claimed for liquidated damages for the 
four and one-half months period between the time the pipeline was 
put into operation and the date of final acceptance. During that: 
time punch list work and landscaping were being performed. The 
trial court denied liquidated damages and the appellate court 
affirmed, stating: 
A liquidated dama'Jes clause becomes a 
penalty when the amount fixed has an in 
terrorem effect of inducing performance rather 
than compensating loss. Manaqement. Inc. v. 
Shassberger, supra [39 Wash. 2d 321, 326, 235 
P.2d 293 (1951)]; Brower v. Garrison, 2 Wash. 
App. 424, 433, 468 P.2d 469 (1970). This is 
such a case. 
* * * 
We hold that a liquidated damages clause 
in a pipeline construction contract, which 
requires the contractor to pay the same $150 
daily rate of damages after the pipeline was 
put into full operation as before, amounted to 
a penalty after the pipeline was put into full 
use. The clause was, therefore, invalid 
insofar as it purported to determine damages 
after the line was put into full use by the 
municipality. Psat'L..j' Fuhrman v. Housing 
Authority, 76 R.I. 87, 68 A.2d 32, 38, 10 
A.L.R.2d 789 (1950); continental Illinois 
'" 540 P.2d 912 (Wash. App. 1975). 
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National Bank & Trust Co. v. United states, 
101 F. Supp. 755, 758, 121 ct. Cl. 203 (1952) i 
Minmar Builders, Inc., CCH Bd. Cont. App. Dec. 
~ 95, 99 (1972). It is literally hornbook 
law: 
In drafting liquidated damages 
clauses, care should be taken to see 
that, if the clause applies to breaches 
of varying seriousness, the amount to be 
paid is adjustable to fit the probable 
damage. 
C. McCormick, Damages § 156 (1935). This 
clause was not so drafted although the daily 
rate of liquidated damages could have been 
easily varied to reflect the entirely 
different range of potential damage that would 
exist once the line went into operation. III 
Likewise, in this case, the same $600 a day assessment applied even 
after the roadway was available for full and unrestricted use by 
the traveling public, and it applied to such minor items as topsoil 
and seeding work. UDOT could have reduced the liquidated damages 
for the period after the project achieved sUbstantial completion. 
Like the liquidated damages in Rowland, UDOT's liquidated damages 
are a penalty. 
2. The burden of proving the unreasonableness of liguidated 
damages should be upon the proponent of the damages, where the 
liquidated damages provision, as applied, is in doubt 
The Court in Fiore acknowledged that, 
When the question of whether a contract 
provides a penalty or liquidated damages is in 
doubt, the contract ordinarill will be 
regarded as providing a penalty. II 
This rule is consistent with the observation of this Court in 
III 540 P.2d at 921-922. 
116 151 P. at 986. 
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Robbins v. Finlay, that liquidated damages provisions are viewed 
wi th some degree of suspicion because they may not reasonably 
approx ima te compensatory damages. 117 Nevertheless, 
Electric Sign Co. v. united Standard west, this Court placed the 
burden on the party challenging the liquidated damages to show that 
there is no reasonable relationship between compensatory and 
liquidated damages ."8 Reliance believes it. has carried that 
burden, as discussed below. But Reliance urges this Court to 
apply to this case the rule recognized in Fiore: that where ·the 
liquidated damages provision, as applied, is in doubt, t:he burden 
should be upon its proponent to show it is not a penalty. This 
rule is particularly appropriate in construction contract cases 
such a '-.~ this one where, first, the contract does not reduce the 
amount of liquidated damages after the project is available for its 
intended use, and second, the same amount of liquidated damaqes 
applies to failures of varying importance. 
3. UDOT's liguidated damages are grossly disproportionate to its 
actual damages as a matter of law. 
The most that UDOT can possibly claim in actual damages, under 
any interpretation of the facts, is the $65,029.79 in engineering 
costs shown on Exhibit 64 for the period of January through June, 
1986, and referred to by the trial court in its Bench Decision. l19 
That amount is only 69.6 percent of the liquidated damages of 
117 645 P.2d at 625. 
118 755 P.2d at 164. 
119 Bench Decision at 12. 
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$93,600. Reliance has demonstrated abovelw that a large portion, 
if not a majority, of UDOT's alleged actual damages are normal 
costs that UDOT would have incurred whether or not ~he Project had 
been completed on time. Therefore, the gap between liquidated 
damages and actual damages is not simply between $93,600 and 
$65,000, but between $93,600 and a much smaller figure. 
In Johnson v. Carman, this Court struck down a liquidated 
damages provision that would have assessed $34,596 where actual 
damages were $25,650, or about 74 percent of the liquidated damage 
amount. The liquidated damages provision can be struck down as a 
matter of law. At the very least, because the liquidated damages 
are clearly in the doubtful range under Utah case law, the burden 
should be on UDOT to prove they are reasonable. 
4. UDOT's Liquidated Damages are Unreasonable as Applied to the 
Amount of Work Remaininq to be Completed. 
In addition to this yawning gap between actual and liquidated 
damages, the unreasonableness of the liquidated damages can also be 
seen by comparing them to the volume of work left to be done at the 
time the liquidated damages started accruing. John Nye's testimony 
placed the maximum amount of work remaining to be performed after 
January 13, 1986, at approximately $350,000. 121 That amount is only 
about 3.5 percent of the total project. Mr. Nye acknowledged that 
IW As discussed in more detail on page 8 of this Brief, this 
$65,029.79 figure even includes charges for work which UDOT would 
have performed regardless of when the Project was accepted. 
121 RT, pp. 267-276; See also testimony of Richard E. Tasker, 
who placed the amount of work remaining as of December 7, 1985, at 
about $175,000, or between 1.9 percent and 3.1 percent. RT, pp. 
308-314. 
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the pE,rcentage left to be completed could go down as a result of 
underruns in quantities. ln The proposed liquidated damages of 
$93,600 are nearly 27 percent of 1:he value of the remaining work, 
while UDOT's total overhead costs are estimated to be ten percent 
of the project cost .123 Even the actual engineering costs allegedly 
incurred by UDOT--$65,0029.79--is 18.6 percent of the value of the 
remaining work. These amounts are so unreasonably out of line with 
the normal percentage for UDOT's total overhead that the disparity 
bears out Reliance's other proof that the actual damages are in 
realit:y much lower than alleged. The disproportion also 
underscores the absurdi ty of assessing liquidated damages 
purportedly based upon "increased overhead" of nearly $100,000 to 
complete $350,000 of work. 124 
CONCLUSION 
1'he lower court erred" as a matter law, in ruling 1:hat 
substantial completion is not the law in utah because (1) 
SUbstantial completion is the law in Utah, (2) substantial 
completion is accepted in all jurisdictions, (3) UDOT's "contrary 
authori ty" also recognizes SUbstantial completion and does not 
preclude its application in this case, and (4) in refusing to apply 
the doctrine of substantial completion, the lower court sanctioned 
In RT pp. 307-308. 
113 RT, P . 193; Ex. 12. 
124 The average tax payer would be shocked to learn that, 
according to UDOT, for every dollar spent for the ac1:ual 
construction of a highway, it costs UDOT nearly 30 cents to oversee 
that construction--and that after the highway is opened for use! 
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the enforcement of an improper penalty. 
Further, because the alleged harm was capable and very easy to 
estimate, the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in ruling that 
the liquidated damage clause was enforceable. 
Finally, because the actual damages bear no reasonable 
relationship to the liquidated damages and result in a penalty 
under Utah law, the lower court erred in finding that there was a 
reasonable relationship and that the liquidated damages provisions 
was enforceable. The trial court's finding that there is a 
reasonable relationship between actual and liquidated damages lS 
against the great weight of evidence and was induced by an 
erroneous view of the law. Moreover, the burden of proving the 
unreasonableness of the liquidated damages should be upon UDOT 
under these circumstances; UDOT's liquidated damages are grossly 
disproportionate to its actual damages; and UDOT' s liquidated 
damages are unreasonable as applied to the amount of work remaining 
to be completed. 
Based on the foregoing substantial and persuasive reasons, 
Appellant Reliance Insurance Company respectfully sUbmits this 
Appellant's Brief for the Court's consideration and determination, 
and requests a reversal of the lower court's ruling. 
DATED this 24+h day of Jal1lA.£(n( 
I 
, 1992. 
FETZER, HENDRICKSON & SIMONSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant Reliance 
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